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Abstract
A classical approach of modeling metaphoric expressions uses a source concept network that is mapped to a target concept
network. Both networks are often represented as algebras. In this paper, a representation using the mathematically sound framework
of heuristic-driven theory projection (HDTP) is presented which is—although quite different from classical approaches—algebraic
in nature, too. HDTP has the advantage that a structural description of source and target can be given and the connection between
both domains are more clearly speciﬁed. The major aspects of the formal properties of HDTP, the speciﬁcation of the underlying
algorithm HDTP-A, and the development of a formal semantics for analogical reasoning will be discussed. We will apply HDTP to
different types of metaphors.
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1. Introduction
Much work has been invested to analyze, model, and conceptualize metaphoric expressions in natural language.
Although the interest in this topic is signiﬁcantly high, the number of existing formal approaches, in particular, the
number of approaches, that can be tested on computers, is less developed. 1 The reason for this is mainly based on
the fact that formal models for metaphors are relatively hard problems. Even the methodological basis of a model for
metaphors is controversial and disputed.
An inﬂuential example for a formally more or less spelled-out framework is [18]. 2 In this account, Indurkhya
represents the target concept network and the source concept network using classical algebras: Pairs A = 〈A,〉 and
B = 〈B,〉 where A and B are sets and  and  are (ﬁnite or ﬁnitely generated) sets of operations deﬁned on A and
B, respectively, are used to represent the source and the target network. The relation 〈R,〉 connecting the target and
source networks (called metaphorical relation) is considered again as an algebra deﬁned on the product of A and B
 This paper is an extended and rewritten version of [14]. Additionally [12,13,25,15] are related to this work.
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: helmar.gust@uos.de (H. Gust), kkuehnbe@uos.de (K.-U. Kühnberger), ute.schmid@wiai.uni-bamberg.de (U. Schmid).
1 A large portion of work done in this ﬁeld is related to literary studies, classical linguistics, and cultural studies. The focus of these disciplines is
clearly not to develop a formal theory of metaphors.
2 Examples for further developments of this account are [3,5].
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with the following characteristics:
R ⊆ A × B,
(n) ⊆ (n) × (n) for all arities n and −1() = ∅ for all  ∈ ,
〈R,〉−1(〈B,〉) ⊆ 〈A,〉 is a concept network and ﬁnitely generated.
Indurkhya’s framework and its successors (compare, for example, [3,5]) model nicely analogies in string domains,
in particular proportional analogies of the form (A : B) :: (C : ?) where A, B, and C are given strings of a certain ﬁnite
alphabet and the question is which string should be chosen for “?”, in order to get the same structural relation between
strings A and B and strings C and “?”. Notice that in examples of proportional analogies usually it is assumed that the
source objects A and B are taken from the same domain as the target objects C and “?”. For these types of analogies
the theory of anti-uniﬁcation—which also can be considered as an algebraic approach—was successfully applied
(cf. [25,15]).
On the other hand, it is not easy to see how Indurkhya-style frameworks can be applied to domains which cannot be
represented in such a straightforward algebraic way. For example, how can this framework be used to model analogies
that require full ﬁrst-order logic for a description of the source and target domains? This type of problems also occurs
in the framework of anti-uniﬁcation, because anti-uniﬁcation is standardly deﬁned on terms but not on complex logical
formulas. A further problem is the establishment of an analogical relation between two different domains encoded in
two different theories. Unfortunately the standard spelled-out examples in algebraic approaches (like the one in [18]) do
not reﬂect this fact. Finally, metaphors often require changes and errors in the establishment of the metaphoric relation.
Whereas formal languages provide a precisely speciﬁed ﬁeld of investigations, metaphors are notoriously vague and
therefore subject to errors and misunderstandings.
We propose a different approach for modeling metaphoric expressions using heuristic-driven theory projection
(HDTP) [15]. A basic hypothesis of our account is that analogical reasoning plays an important role in the modeling
of metaphors: we think that a large number of metaphors can be reduced to analogical reasoning. Hence, the same
frameworks that can be used for analogical reasoning can be used for many metaphors as well. 3 A justiﬁcation of this
claim is the fact that many metaphors can be formulated as analogies:
(1) Gills are the lungs of ﬁsh.
(2) Gills are to ﬁsh as lungs are to mammals.
Although (2) speciﬁes the relation between gills and lungs explicitly, whereas (1) does not, the meaning of (1) and
(2) are equivalent provided appropriate contexts for (1) and (2) are given. It is straightforward to represent (2) as a
proportional analogy of the from (A : B) :: (C : D).
A basic idea of HDTP is to use a structural description of both, the target domain and the source domain, in order to
achieve an analysis of metaphors. HDTP can be used for generating such a general structural description. Furthermore,
HDTP is a generalization of the theory of anti-uniﬁcation (AU) (cf. [24]) or the computation of the most speciﬁc
generalization (cf. [23]). The signiﬁcant differences between AU and HDTP are summarized as follows:
In contrast to classical AU . . .
• . . . not only terms are generalized but whole theories of given domains, i.e. conjunctions of complex formulas
representing axioms of a theory;
• . . . an equational theory E is added to handle equality concerning terms (cf. [2]) and equivalences concerning
formulas. The latter models equivalences of the form ab ↔ ba.
• . . . HDTP is heuristic-driven: the task to ﬁnd an generalizations is governed by heuristics implemented in the
algorithm HDTP-A.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In Section 2, we will discuss similarities and differences
between analogies and metaphors. A development of the basic ideas of HDTP together with a spelled-out example of
a predictive analogy (Rutherford analogy) will be discussed in Section 3. In Section 4, we will examine the details of
HDTP from a syntactic, an algorithmic, and a semantic perspective making the similarities but also the differences to
anti-uniﬁcation precise. In Section 5, we will apply HDTP to metaphors in natural language. Finally, we will conclude
this article in Section 6.
3 An independent support for this claim was recently provided in [10].
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2. Metaphors and analogies
2.1. Similarities between metaphors and analogies
Metaphors and analogies occur in a large variety of domains, as well as in quite different forms. Therefore, we restrict
our attention to the analysis of metaphors and analogies to computational traditions in artiﬁcial intelligence, linguistics,
and cognitive science. In order to classify certain aspects and properties of analogies, three types of analogies can be
distinguished (cf. [18,25]): First, proportional analogies have the general form (A : B) :: (C : ?). These analogies
were studied in the domain of natural language (compare (2)), with respect to geometric ﬁgures (cf. [6,22]), and in
string domains (cf. [17]). Algebraic accounts can be used to characterize proportional analogies (cf. [20]) and to model
applications of them (cf. [18]). Second, predictive analogies explain a new domain (target) by specifying similarities
with a given domain (source), i.e. by transferring information from the source to the target (cf. [9,16]). Examples
are metaphoric expressions in natural language as well as more complex conceptualizations of physical correlations
between seemingly different domains (compare Section 3 for the Rutherford analogy and [12] for the well-known
heat-ﬂow example). Third, analogical problem solving can be used to solve a problem by transferring a solution from a
well-known domain to an unknown domain. An example is the usage of a LISP program for developing new program
code (cf. [1]). It is neither claimed that this classiﬁcation of analogies is complete, nor that it is the only possible one.
Rather such a classiﬁcation can be useful to specify different properties of analogies.
It is often mentioned that metaphors are strongly connected to analogies (cf. [10,18]). The classiﬁcation above makes
clear that certain metaphors can be considered as proportional analogies and predictive analogies. Dependent on the
context one and the same metaphor can be proportional or predictive.
(3) Electrons are the planets of the atom.
Given a situation in which a teacher is lecturing students elementary atom physics, (3) can be interpreted as a
predictive analogy: the students learn a new conceptualization of the atom. On the other hand, for scientist (3) can be
simply interpreted as a (historically important) proportional analogy.
2.2. Differences between metaphors and analogies
Assume that the metaphoric expression (3) is given establishing an analogy between electrons and planets. In
comparison to predictive analogies in naive physics, the metaphoric example (3) is both, simpler and more complicated:
• It is simpler because several, sometimes complicated, laws of physics need not to be formalized in order to get a
meaning of the metaphor: in many relevant contexts, a metaphorical relation establishes a simple analogy between
particular properties of the involved concepts. Hence, metaphors require just some transferred facts from the source
to the target.
• It is more complicated because there is no clear correct or incorrect way of modeling. Dependent on the context,
the usage, the intention of the speaker, the background knowledge of the hearer, etc. (3) can mean many different
things, whereas in physics, a predictive analogy either is in accordance to a given conceptualization of the laws of
physics or is not.
The twomentioned aspects have certain consequences for our representation. In particular, themodeling of predictive
analogies as described in [13,25] cannot be applied without any restrictions to metaphoric expressions. Whereas in
the physical realm there are elaborated theories that govern analogical reasoning 4 often no such spelled-out theories
are available for metaphoric expressions. For example, the concept of a planet for a physicist is clearly embedded in
a physical theory where certain laws govern the behavior of such an entity in a solar system. On the other hand, for a
non-specialized native speaker of natural language, the concept of a planet is less clear. The speaker knows examples
(like Earth), perhaps she knows that planets occur always together with a sun, the corresponding system forms a central
body system, and perhaps she knows that planets usually revolve around this sun. But this seems to be the maximal set
of facts that can be assumed concerning the assumptions that govern metaphorical expressions.
4 Although those theories are considered as qualitative and essentially causal in nature, they give a large amount of information about the involved
domains.
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3. Using theory projection for predictive analogies
3.1. The Rutherford analogy
Qualitative physics is an interesting case for analogical reasoning because it shows interesting productive aspects
of cognition. Fig. 1 gives an analysis of the well-known Rutherford metaphor (3). According to [9], a domain is
represented as a structure (a graph) with objects (such as sun, planet-i), attributes (such as yellow(sun)), and relations
(such as attracts(sun,planet-i)). Besides the ﬁrst-order relations, which are deﬁned on objects, there is a second-order
relation, deﬁned on relations:
cause(attracts(sun,planet-i), revolves_around(planet-i,sun)).
All entities are represented as nodes in the graph. The arcs represent relations between entities, in other words, their
roles (e.g. S for subject or O for object).
Analogical reasoning is modeled as a structure preserving partial mapping  from the source to the target. According
toGentner’s principle of systematicity (cf. [9]), mappings of larger structures are preferred.With respect to (3), mapping
sun to nucleus and planet-i to electron-i results in a large structural congruence between both domains. Because each
object can carry over nodes from the source to the target to which it is connected, the causal explanation why a planet
revolves around the sun is transferred to the target domain, resulting in the inference that an electron revolves around
the nucleus because it is attracted by it. Notice that in the structure mapping engine (SME) in [7] the nodes representing
relations (including attributes as 1-ary relations) must be named identically in the source and the target domain forcing
 to be the identity on relations. The systematicity principle translates to the well-known problem of ﬁnding the greatest
common subgraph of two graphs (cf. [19]).
We think that the roughly described model has certain conceptual deﬁciencies:
• The whole mapping seems to be rather trivial, because the causal explanation is built into the modeling:
revolves_around(planet-i,sun) and revolves_around(electron-i,nucleus) are explicitly given in both conceptualiza-
tions and guide crucially the transfer mapping. Therefore, metaphor (3) can be used to describe a situation where
the hearer of the utterance does not need to perform productive inferences or transfers. Particularly, learning does
not seem to play a role. But this conceptualization is not appropriate to model the creative aspects of analogies
and metaphors. On the other hand, the transfer of new information from the source to the target, for example, the
establishment of a new concept in the target is not possible, although this seems to be crucial for many types of
analogies (cf. [18]).
• The explanation is physically wrong, because the two involved attracts relations identiﬁed in the SME model are
just things that are not identical. They correspond to different forces, namely gravity and Coulomb, respectively.
• It is questionable whether Fig. 1 is a natural description of how analogies are used in physics in the described
case. What is measurable on the atom side is that the nucleus is heavier than the electron, that the electron has a
negative electric charge whereas the nucleus has a positive electric charge, and that the classical plum pudding model
(cf. [26,11]) of the atom contradicts experimental experience, namely the scattering experiments by Rutherford. It is
not measurable that the electron revolves around the nucleus rather this should be the inference from the data above.
• It is not clear what the semantics of the described representation should be. A match of relations that are similarly
labeled does not involve any kind of semantics. Rather it seems to be a match of syntactic strings.
Whereas for certain situations the discussed modeling seems to be an intuitively plausible and correct representation,
this does not seem to be true for the general case. In particular, the described representation does not provide a solution
for the problem how productive transfers of concepts can be modeled.
3.2. The modeling of the domains
We want to represent the situation where a conceptualization of the solar system can be used to get a new con-
ceptualization of the Rutherford atom model. The solar system is conceptualized using a set of axioms AS which
in turn induces a theory T hS as depicted in Fig. 2: planet and sun are considered to be objects. Certain observable
properties (or features) are measurable with respect to these objects by performing experiments: the mass of an object,
the distance between two objects, and a force between two objects, called gravity, as well as the centrifugal force
between two objects—provided an object o1 is following a circular path around an object o2. Additionally, certain
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Fig. 1. Structure-mapping for the Rutherford analogy (cf. [9, Fig. 1]).
Fig. 2. Modeling the physics of a solar system using a theory T hS .
facts and laws about objects ensure that regularities are given in the source conceptualization governing the behavior of
the system.
The atom model is given by a set of axioms AT (compare Fig. 3). Again these axioms induce a theory T hT about
atoms. The conceptualization of the atom does not contain as much information as the conceptualization of the solar
system, because otherwise the establishment of a creative analogy would not be necessary. As objects electron and
nucleus are given as distinct objects. Observable properties are the electric charge of objects as well asmasses of objects.
Additionally we assume that the Coulomb force between two objects can be measured. Concerning facts governing
electron and nucleus, we presuppose that the electron as well as the nucleus have a mass and an electric charge. The
latter is the reason why there is a Coulomb force attracting the two objects. Notice that gravity as well as the Coulomb
force have the same direction here, i.e. both forces attract electrons and the nucleus (represented by gravity (electron,
nucleus, t)> 0 and coulomb (electron, nucleus, t)> 0). As long as we are interested in a qualitative analysis of the atom
model, it is sufﬁcient to consider only one force, namely the one with the grater magnitude, i.e. the Coulomb force.
Last but not least, we are able to perform experiments, in order to test whether analogical transfers yield experimentally
valid results. One of these experiments is essentially an abstract representation of the Rutherford experiment, i.e. an
experiment that shows that electrons and nucleus have a distance from each other greater than 0.
It is worth noticing that the predicate revolves_around has no corresponding predicate in the target domain. Simply
transferring this fact to the target would be possible in principal, but there is no way to test in an experiment whether this
predicate applies in the target domain. A better modeling is to give an explanation why these concepts can be used in the
target domain. This can be achieved by performing an experiment measuring that dist (electron, nucleus, t) > 0 and
by applying a general (transferred) law from the source that results in the fact revolves_around(electron, nucleus).
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Fig. 3. Modeling the physics of the atom model using a theory T hT .
3.3. The analogical transfer
We will use an extension of the well-known theory of anti-uniﬁcation to model predictive analogies in naive
physics called HDTP. Classical ﬁrst-order anti-uniﬁcation is formally founded on the mathematics of term algebras
(cf. [23]). We extend this framework to anti-unify not only terms but whole theories (for a detailed discussion compare
Section 4).
In HDTP projections are used to ﬁnd generalizations of the two theories T hS and T hT . In order to introduce some
important concepts for HDTP, we will ﬁrst consider the classical case of term anti-uniﬁcation: anti-unifying two ﬁrst-
order terms t1 and t2 of a given term algebra T erm means to construct a third term t and two substitutions 1 and
2 such that t1 = t and t2 = t.
Given an equational theory E and a term algebra T erm we can introduce the concept of subsumption: A term t
subsumes a term s relative to a given equational theory E if the following equivalence holds:
sEt ⇐⇒ ∃ : E  t = s.
A term t is called an anti-instance of a set of terms T if t subsumes all t ′ ∈ T . An equational theory E allows to
express equalities between term expressions. In a concrete situation usually one is confronted with a whole bunch of
(possible) anti-instances. Anti-instances can be interpreted as structural descriptions of the underlying terms, because
anti-instances are generalizations of those terms, and together with the substitutions the original terms can be re-
established. Taking into account the fact that there are in general many possible anti-instances, it is natural to ask
which set of anti-instances is most speciﬁc, complete, and minimal (cf. [12,27], and Section 4.1). These anti-instances
can be identiﬁed with minimal structural descriptions of certain objects because, intuitively, they are as informative
as necessary (completeness) and they are not more informative than necessary (minimality and speciﬁcity). Compare
Section 4 for a detailed discussion of these concepts.
The sketched ﬁrst-order case of anti-uniﬁcation is relatively simple and straightforward. But for our purposes we
need a weak form of second-order anti-uniﬁcation. Consider the following example of an equivalence where the term
on the left side is an expression of equational theory E1 and the term on the right side is an expression of equational
theory E2:
f (h(c, h(a, b))) ↔ g(h(a, b)).
Syntactic anti-uniﬁcation results in the anti-instanceF(h(X, Y ))where the substitutions1 and2 are given as follows
(we use capital letters for variables introduced by the anti-uniﬁcation process):
1/2 : F → f/g,
X → c/a,
Y → h(a, b)/b.
The presented anti-instance is a rather weak type of a second-order anti-uniﬁcation: it can be embedded into a syntactic
ﬁrst-order anti-uniﬁcation. Nevertheless there are other anti-instances, e.g. F(h(a, b)), requiring stronger types of
second-order anti-uniﬁcation. In this case substitutions are given by
1/2 : F → y.(f (h(c, y)))/g.
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Table 1
Anti-instances of our modeling
Source theory T hS Target theory T hT Generalized theory T hG
mass(s) > mass(p) mass(n) > mass(e) mass(Y ) > mass(X)
rev_around(p, s) rev_around(e, n) rev_around(X, Y )
gravity(p, s, t) > 0 coulomb(e, n, t) > 0 F(X, Y, t) > 0
dist (p, s, t) > 0 dist (e, n, t) > 0 dist (X, Y, t) > 0
Table 2
Hypotheses of the target domain
Laws
∀t : t ime, o1 : object, o2 : object : ∀t : t ime, o1 : object, o2 : object :
dist (o1, o2, t) > 0∧ dist (o1, o2, t) > 0∧
coulomb(o1, o2, t) > 0 centrif ugal(o1, o2, t) < 0
→ →
∃f orce : f orce(o1, o2, t) < 0∧ revolves_around(o1, o2)
f orce(o1, o2, t) = centrif ugal(o1, o2, t)
This second-order anti-uniﬁcation can still be embedded into the ﬁrst-order case provided an equational theory is
available in which ∀y : f (h(c, y)) = f ′(y) is provable for some (possibly new) function symbol f ′. This results in
the simple substitution
1/2 : F → f ′/g
We can conclude that a certain subclass of second-order anti-uniﬁcation can be rewritten as ﬁrst-order E-anti-uniﬁ-
cations. In Section 4.2 we will specify this subclass in a more general setting. With regard to the Rutherford analogy
the examined weak type of second-order anti-uniﬁcation is sufﬁcient to model the analogy in an important respect, but
we are not able to model the anti-uniﬁcation of whole theories yet. This is where theory projection is used to generalize
the source and the target domain in order to ﬁnd a generalization. Theory projection is a heuristic-driven association of
complex formulas (not just simple terms) of given theories where the anti-uniﬁcation process is recursively extended
from terms to atomic formulas and formulas (cf. Section 4). The task to ﬁnd appropriate candidates for generalizations is
implemented using the algorithm HDTP-A (cf. Section 4.3). Table 1 summarizes the anti-instances of theory projection
relative to the theories given in Figs. 2 and 3 (we use e and n as shortcuts for electron resp. nucleus and p and s for
planet resp. sun):
Applying appropriate substitutions to the anti-instances yield again theories T hS and T hT . The corresponding
substitutions 1 and 2 for the anti-uniﬁcation such that Source = T hG1 and T arget = T hG2 are given by
1/2 : X → planet/electron,
Y → sun/nucleus,
F → gravity/coulomb.
Notice that by transferring the laws of the source domain to the target domain we get hypothetical laws in the tar-
get domain as well. These laws are not simply mapped one-to-one to the target but governed by the anti-instances.
Table 2 speciﬁes the result of this transfer.
A remark concerning the laws of the source domain: these laws are transferred to the target domain with their
respective interpretation. Just because we can apply these laws it is possible to deduce that an electron is revolving
around a nucleus, i.e. we can give an explanation why the electron is revolving. This is a prediction, hence a cre-
ative or productive aspect, which follows from the analogical reasoning process. 5 The experiment on the target side
5 If later an experiment shows that this fact can be falsiﬁed (as shown by Niels Bohr), then of course the whole analogy must be challenged. In
our contemporary atom model quantum physics effects are responsible for the counter force (of the Coulomb force). Hence only a weaker law can
be transferred implying a modiﬁcation of the source domain. But this is not in focus of this work.
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(cf. Fig. 3) can be considered as a test procedure for the transfer. Only those transfers are allowed that are consistent
with the observable data.
4. The syntax and semantics of HDTP
In this section, we will discuss the formal details of HDTP. We will start our considerations by examining the
basic ideas of ﬁrst-order anti-uniﬁcation and its extensions to HDTP. Then we will introduce the underlying algorithm
HDTP-A. Finally, we will examine the semantics of an analogical relation between source and target computed by
HDTP-A.
4.1. First-order anti-uniﬁcation
A crucial idea of HDTP is the establishment of a generalization of theories quite similar to the theory of ﬁrst-order
anti-uniﬁcation establishing a generalization of terms. We will consider ﬁrst-order anti-uniﬁcation ﬁrst, and extend this
approach in a second step. First-order anti-uniﬁcation is crucially based on (sorted) term algebras. The following two
deﬁnitions make the concept of a signature and the concept of a term algebra precise.
Deﬁnition 1. A many-sorted signature  = {Sort, Func, T ype} is given by a partially ordered set of sorts Sort,
a set of function symbols Func, and a function Type : Func → Cl(Sort) where Cl(Sort) is the closure of
sorts under products. 6
Deﬁnition 2. Assume a signature  is given. The term algebra T erm(, V , C) relative to an (inﬁnite) set of sorted
variables V = {x1 : s1, x2 : s2, . . .} with si ∈ Cl(Sort) and a (ﬁnite) set of sorted constantsC = {a1 : s1, . . . , an : sn}
with sj ∈ Cl(Sort) is deﬁned as the smallest set such that the following conditions hold:
(1) If x : s ∈ V is given, then x : s ∈ T erm(, V , C).
(2) If a : s ∈ C is given, then a : s ∈ T erm(, V , C).
(3) If f ∈ Func, Type(f ) = s1 × s2 × . . . × sn → s, and ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} : Type(ti) = si is given, then
f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T erm(, V , C) and furthermore Type(f (t1, . . . , tn)) = s.
In order to simplify the readability of formal expressions we suppress the coding of the corresponding sorts of
variables and constants in the following parts if sort restrictions are clear from the context. Given a term algebra
T erm(, V , C) we can deﬁne substitutions on terms.
Deﬁnition 3. Assume a term algebra T erm(, V , C) is given. A substitution on terms is a partial function  : V →
T erm(, V , C) mapping variables to terms, formally represented by  : {x1 → t1, . . . , xn → tn} (provided xi = xj
for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} and i = j ). For a given substitution  we can deﬁne domain, range, and the value of  relative
to a given variable v as follows:
dom() = {x | x → t ∈ },
range() = {t | x → t ∈ },
value(, v) = t if v → t ∈ .
Given a term algebra Term(, V , C) we call the collection of all possible substitutions SUB. In the following we will
assume that the variables in domain() and the variables occurring in range() are disjoint. Using a substitution 
we are able to replace variables by terms. Such substitutions can be extended to complex terms by the introduction of
a function sub that recursively applies substitutions .
6 As usual, we will write the type of a function f with domain s′ and range s as s′ → s instead of s′ × s.
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Deﬁnition 4. Assume a substitution ∈ SUB is given.We recursively deﬁne a function sub : SUB×Term(, V , C) →
T erm(, V , C) as follows:
sub(, c) = c if c is a constant,
sub(, v) = value(, v) if v ∈ dom(),
sub(, f (t1, . . . tn)) = f (sub(, t1), . . . , sub(, tn)).
In order to preserve readability we simply write t instead of sub(, t). As already used in Section 3.3 we deﬁne
a subsumption relation on terms relative to a given equational theory E as follows (cf. [2]):
sEt ⇐⇒ ∃ ∈ SUB : E  t = s.
If sEt holds then we call t a generalization of s. The subsumption relation of terms allows us to order terms in a
hierarchy according to their speciﬁcity. Intuitively an anti-instance of a set of terms T = {t1, . . . , tn} is a term a together
with the corresponding substitutions (a, {1, . . . ,n}) that subsumes all elements of T. Clearly there are in general
many possible anti-instances relative to a given set of terms T. In order to get a preferred set of anti-instances we need
to require certain conditions on this set of anti-instances: it needs to be complete, minimal, and most speciﬁc.
Deﬁnition 5. Assume a set of termsT = {t1, . . . , tn}where ti ∈ T erm(, V , C) is given.We call a set of anti-instances
AI = {(a1, {11, . . . ,1n}), (a2, {21, . . . ,2n}), . . . , (ak, {k1, . . . ,kn})}
relative to a given equational theory E appropriate if the following three conditions are met:
(i) ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}∀j ∈ {1, . . . , n} : E  aiij = tj
(ii) ∀t ∈ T erm(, V , C) : (∀i∈{1, . . . , n}∃i ∈ SUB : E  ti = ti )
⇒ ∃ ∈ SUB ∃m∈{1, . . . , k} : E  t = am
(iii) ¬∃i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}∃ ∈ SUB : i = j ∧ E  ai = aj
Appropriate sets of anti-instances can be interpreted as follows: the ﬁrst condition of Deﬁnition 5 establishes the
constitutive relation between terms and anti-instances. Appropriate sets of anti-instances must be complete in the sense
that every term t ∈ T can be reconstructed using an anti-instance a ∈ AI with an appropriate substitution. The second
condition ensures that appropriate sets of anti-instances are most speciﬁc: if a term t subsumes all elements of T, then
there is an element (a, {1, . . . ,n}) such that t also subsumes a. Finally, the third condition means that appropriate
anti-instances must be minimal: anti-instances from AI form a minimal basis of anti-instances, i.e. they cannot be
gained from each other by applying a further substitution. Appropriate sets of anti-instances generalize the concept
of most speciﬁc anti-instances in ﬁrst-order anti-uniﬁcation without equational theory E: If E is empty, Deﬁnition 3.1
reduces to the classical ﬁrst-order anti-uniﬁcation on terms for which it is shown in [23] that the set of all most speciﬁc
anti-instances is a singleton. 7
4.2. Theory projection
In Section 4.1, we examined how to use anti-uniﬁcation to calculate an anti-instance of given terms. For the task
to ﬁnd generalizations of the source and the target domains we need an extended approach: not only terms need to be
anti-uniﬁed, but also whole theories encoded as complex formulas in a ﬁrst-order language need to be generalized.
The underlying hypothesis is that the source domain is considered to be a rich domain with a large amount of facts
and laws determining the conceptualization. In contrast to the source, the target is considered to be a meager domain
with only a few background assumptions restricting arbitrariness of the conceptualization. The source or target input
is given by a set of facts Fact (variable-free literals) and set of laws Law (quantiﬁed formulas). The resulting theory is
deﬁned as
T h = { | Fact ∪ Law  }.
7 In the second-order case, where we wish to anti-unify also higher-order objects like functions and relations this claim does not necessarily hold,
but in restricted cases there are only ﬁnitely many anti-instances (cf. [27] and Section 4.2). In order to ﬁnd generalizations of two theories T hS and
T hT precisely this is required.
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Given a theory T hS (for the source domain) and a theory T hT (for the target domain) the task is to ﬁnd possible
candidates  ∈ T hS and 	 ∈ T hT such that for a generalization:
AI = {(a1, {11,12}), . . . , (ak, {k1,k2})},
we get for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} : aii1 =  and aii2 = 	. This task can be solved as follows: assume two formulas
 ∈ T hS and 	 ∈ T hT are given in languages LS and LT , respectively. The generalization is calculated by recursively
extending anti-uniﬁcation on terms to anti-uniﬁcation on formulas  and 	. Atomic formulas R(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T hS and
R′(t ′1, . . . , t ′m) ∈ T hT can be treated similarly as functional terms deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4. For example, a substitution
on R(t1, . . . , tn) ∈ T hS can be deﬁned as follows:
sub(, R(t1, . . . , tn)) = R(sub(, t1), . . . , sub(, tn)).
In order to deﬁne substitutions on complex formulas  ∈ T hS and 	 ∈ T hT , we transform  and 	 into an appropriate
normal form NF() and NF(	), e.g. CNF.  and 	 can be generalized if NF() and NF(	) are structurally equal.
Then the generalization is simply performed by anti-unifying the corresponding literals.
It remains to show that the described second-order aspects and the usage of an equational theory (cf. Section 3) do
not result in inﬁnitely many generalizations in a computation. In order to do this, we deﬁne a subclass of ﬁrst-order
E-generalizations that ﬁts our purposes. In the following, we denote with st (a) the set of all subterms occurring in a
where a is a term or a formula. Furthermore, a sequence {t ′1, . . . , t ′k} ⊂ X (where X is a set of terms) is called admissible
relative to X, if the variables occurring in {t ′1, . . . , t ′k} are exactly the variables occurring in X.
Deﬁnition 6. Assume a term algebra T erm(, V , C), an equational theory E, and a (complex) term f (t1, . . . , tn) ∈
T erm(, V , C) is given. An expansion of  and E relative to f (t1, . . . , tn) is deﬁned as the smallest expansion of 
and E such that the following condition hold:
For each admissible sequence {t ′1, . . . , t ′k} relative to st (f (t1, . . . , tn)) a new function symbol h and an equation∀(h(t ′1, . . . , t ′k) = f (t1, . . . , tn)) are contained in  and E, respectively.
The intuition of Deﬁnition 6 is that the added equations describe permuting arguments, removing arguments, and
substituting arguments by their subterms. Exactly those second-order problems which are based on these operations
can be reduced to the ﬁrst-order case with equational theory E. A problem that cannot be reduced by this method is,
for example, argument introduction. Obviously an expansion of  and E relative to f (t1, . . . , tn) results in adding a
ﬁnite number of equations in solved form.
Deﬁnition 7. Assume a set of axioms A is given. An expansion of A relative to a conjunction of formulas P1 ∧ . . .∧Pn
is deﬁned as the smallest expansion such that it holds:
For each admissible sequence {t ′1, . . . , t ′k} relative to st (P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pn) a new predicate symbol H and a formula∀(H(t ′1, . . . , t ′k) ↔ P1 ∧ . . . ∧ Pn) are added to A.
Given a set of axioms A we can use Deﬁnition 7 to add a ﬁnite number of new formulas, i.e. deﬁnitions of new
predicates, because there are only ﬁnitely many subformulas in A. Then Deﬁnition 6 can be used to add a ﬁnite number
of deﬁnitions of new functions, because there are only ﬁnitely many subterms in A. These new predicates and functions
are now available for the generalization process by ﬁrst-order anti-uniﬁcation. Using such newly introduced functions
or predicates in ﬁrst-order anti-uniﬁcation steps correspond to second-order anti-uniﬁcation using the original theories:
The right-hand sides of the equations or equivalences, respectively, can be used instead of the left-hand sides, but
now with the explicit structure changing operations used in the substitutions, which are now second order. 8 A trivial
consequence is that for a given term t there are only ﬁnitely many s such that E  t = s. With respect to Deﬁnition 5 this
means: if E contains only equations in solved form, then there are only ﬁnitely many anti-instances for two terms t and
t ′. This can be extended to generalizations of atomic formulas. Consequently, a class of second-order generalizations
8 The algorithmic solution computes the needed new function and predicate deﬁnitions only on demand, namely if they are needed to reduce a
second-order anti-uniﬁcation step to the ﬁrst-order case.
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Fig. 4. The algorithm HDTP-A generalizing two theories T hS and T hT .
can be reduced to the ﬁrst-order case (with equational theory E). All problems of the type discussed in this article can
be solved with this method.
To summarize the theory so far: the underlying idea is to compute possible generalizations stage-by-stage together
with their substitutions governed by a certain heuristics. The restriction to the described subclass of second-order
generalizations ensures ﬁniteness of this approach. After the generalization as many source facts and laws as possible
are transferred to the target provided the transfer does not result in an inconsistency. The process of the generalization
and the transfer of facts and laws we call theory projection. The motivation to transfer as many axioms as possible to the
target domain is related to the systematicity principle of the SME model (compare Section 3.1) and the metaphorical
relation in [18]. The assumption is that the larger the number of (consistent) correspondences is that can be established
the more (psychologically) preferred is the interpretation.
4.3. The algorithmic generalization of theories
In this subsection, we will present the algorithm HDTP-A computing generalizations together with their correspond-
ing substitutions provided a conceptualization of the source domain and the target domain is given. 9 The process can
roughly be described as depicted in Fig. 4.
The input is given by conceptualizations S inducing a theory T hS of the source domain, which is coded in a language
LS , and by the conceptualization T inducing a theory T hT of the target domain, which is coded in a language LT . The
output of the algorithm is a set of generalized axioms G inducing a theory T hG which is coded in the language L+S⊕T
generalizing the source domain and the target domain. L+S⊕T contains predicates and functions from source and target
and a set of new variable symbols. The algorithm chooses an axiom from the target domain T governed by a heuristics
h and searches for an axiom from the source domain S to generalize both. If a generalization is found, the resulting
generalized axiom is added to the generalized theory. This process is recursively applied until all axioms in the target
are generalized.
Finally, remaining axioms from the source can be transferred to the target and the generalized theory, using the
computed substitutions as long as the transferred axioms are consistent with the extended target theory T hAhT . In order
9 The algorithm described in this subsection is based on the implementation in [12].
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to check whether the transferred axioms hold in the intended interpretation of the target, an oracle or test procedure
is used representing an experiment. If the transferred axioms do not pass the test, the transfer will be rejected. The
described transfer is an important aspect of the algorithm because it allows the introduction of new concepts on the
target side. As an example compare [25] where it is shown how to generate a concept like heat-ﬂow on the target side
although this concept is not present in the original input.
The algorithm allows the implementation of a variety of different heuristics concerning the selection of axioms
from the target domain and the selection of potential candidates for generalization in the source domain. Some pos-
sible heuristics h that can be used for choosing axioms are summarized in the following list (which is obviously not
complete):
(1) Select axioms from the target domain ﬁrst.
Remark: The target is considered to be less rich than the source and should be completely covered by the analogy,
whereas (usually) not all source axioms will be generalizable.
(2) Select simple axioms ﬁrst relative to the number of embedded relations, the arity of embedded relations, the number
of logical connectives, etc.
Remark: The search space to ﬁnd corresponding axioms in the source is reduced and the number of possible
generalizations is minimized.
(3) Select axioms that maximize the number of shared terms with already generalized axioms.
Remark: This heuristics minimizes the need of additional substitutions.
All these heuristics can always be used and do not change the set of solutions. Only the order by which they are
computed is effected. Furthermore, they are independent from each other and simple to compute. We need a further
heuristics h′ to select an appropriate generalization from the computed generalizations:
(1) Select anti-instances with minimal length of substitutions ﬁrst.
Remark: The minimization of the global number of substitutions can be approximated by choosing this local
heuristics.
(2) Select anti-instances with a minimal number of second-order objects in the substitutions ﬁrst. 10
Remark: Second-order substitutions result in a structurally stronger modiﬁcation.
These heuristics can always be used, but there may be a trade-off between (1) and (2). Again these heuristics do not
change the set of solutions. Since the number of alternative solutions even if ﬁnite can be rather large, it is important to
compute good solutions as early as possible. It is not simple to specify what good should mean in this context. Usually
it is assumed that analogies and metaphors cannot be right or wrong but rather more or less cognitively preferred,
i.e. more or less good. A cognitive hypothesis is that simpler solutions are (usually) preferred compared to more
complex solutions. In this context, simpler means less transformation operations or operations leading to less structural
changes. 11
4.4. Semantics
In this subsection, a semantics for analogical transfer will be established. The idea is to establish a bisimulation-
like relation called analogical relation between source and target. 12 This is mirrored by the generalization and the
corresponding substitutions of the two input domains source and target.
Deﬁnition 8. The language LS of the source domain and the language LT of the target domain are standard many-
sorted ﬁrst-order predicate logic languages relative to a given term algebra T erm(, V , C). Suppressing the sortal
10 This corresponds to minimizing the use of equations and equivalences introduced by Deﬁnitions 6 and 7.
11 A similar idea is used in [4,5] to compute preferred Gestalts of certain similarity patterns. Some empirical evidence is given for minimizing
structural changes.
12 A deﬁnition of cognitive relation is already given in [18] that is quite close to the classical deﬁnition of a bisimulation: structural identity without
being isomorphic. Unfortunately, the author does not take into account the processes that are involved in order to establish such a bisimulation,
namely the processes having to do with ﬁnding generalizations of the two given domains. We will give a precise characterization of the relation
between source and target in semantic terms.
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restrictions the following sub-languages can be speciﬁed:
Terms t ::= x | c | f n(t1, . . . , tn).
Logical constants l ::= ∧ | ∨ | → | ↔ |¬ | ∀ | ∃ | =.
Atomic (well-formed) formulas 
 ::= t = s |Rn(t1, . . . , tn),
Well-formed formulas  ::= 
 | ∧ 	 | ∨ 	 | ¬ | → 
 | ↔ 	 | ∀x | ∃x.
We suppressed the coding of the sorts Sort in the deﬁnition of terms and formulas due to simplify readability.
Clearly our present Prolog implementation is based on a language with less expressive power, because of the restriction
of Prolog to Horn clauses. For the theoretical investigations concerning formal properties of generalized theories we
can drop this restriction and consider as base language full ﬁrst-order predicate logic.
Theories of the source and target domains are given by axioms specifying facts that hold in a particular domain and
rules that can be used to deduce new facts in the domain. The axioms do not specify a complete calculus, but rather an
underspeciﬁed description of the domain.
Deﬁnition 9. A theory Th of a language L is speciﬁed as a consistent and ﬁnite set of well-formed formulas of L
(axioms) of the following form:
Facts: 
 ::= Rn(t1, . . . tn) | t = s | 
 ∧  | 
 ∨ ,
Laws:  ::=  → 	 | ∀x | ∃x.
We assume that partial standard ﬁrst-order predicate logic models with equality are given for the input of source and
target domains.
Deﬁnition 10. Given a theory Th and a modelM = 〈D, I 〉, truth of formulas is deﬁned as usual: 13
M  t = s iff I+(t) = I+(s),
M  R(t1, . . . tn) iff 〈I+(t1), . . . , I+(tn)〉 ∈ R,
M  
 ∧  iff M  
 andM  ,
M  
 ∨  iff M  
 orM  ,
M   → 	 iff M  orM  	,
M  ∀x iff for all m ∈ D :M  (m),
M  ∃x iff for some m ∈ D :M  (m).
The algorithm as described in Section 4.3 takes as input two theories T hS and T hT for the source domain and the target
domain, respectively. The intuitive idea of the semantics of a metaphor is the establishment of an analogical relation
between source and target corresponding to a (psychologically) preferred interpretation of the metaphor. 14 In general,
such an analogical relation cannot be established directly, because the two input theories can be quite incoherent and the
result would be rather arbitrary. A better approach is to ﬁnd an analogical relation induced by the algorithm. Let T hS
and T hT be two input theories (source theory and target theory, respectively). The result of the algorithm HDTP-Ah
with heuristics h applied to T hS and T hT is a generalized theory T hG together with two theories T hAhS and T h
Ah
T ,
which are byproducts of the algorithm. Particularly, the computation of normal forms (cf. Section 4.2) and applications
of the equational theory result in a modiﬁcation of the original input theories T hS and T hT . Now it is possible to deﬁne
the concept of an analogical relation between two theories T hAhS and T h
Ah
T . In the following deﬁnition we write Ah
instead of HDTP-Ah in order to increase the readability of the formulas.
13 I+ denotes the homomorphic extension of I to terms.
14 Notice that an interpretation of a metaphor cannot be right or wrong. Rather it is the case that certain interpretations are psychologically more
of less preferred. Examples of empirical results concerning such preferred interpretations of metaphors can be found in [21,5,8].
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Fig. 5. Diagrammatic representation of an analogical relation between two theories T hAh
S
⊕ T ermS and T hAhT ⊕ T ermT and the induced relation
R on the model theoretic level.
Deﬁnition 11. Assume two theories T hAhS and T h
Ah





T and a coproduct (disjoint union) operation ⊕ are given. An analogical relation
R ⊆ (T hAhS × T hAhT ) ⊕ (T erm(S, VS, CS) × T erm(T , VT , CT ))
of theories is a set of pairs 〈x, y〉 such that it holds:
(i) If 〈,	〉 is a pair of formulas and 〈,	〉 ∈ R, then there exists g ∈ T hAhG such that (g, {1,2}) is an
anti-instance of  and 	 and
T h
Ah
T ∪ ET  g2 ↔ 	 and T hAhS ∪ ES  g1 ↔ .
(ii) If 〈t, t ′〉 is a pair of terms and 〈t, t ′〉 ∈ R, then there exists g ∈ T ermG such that (g, {1,2}) is an anti-instance
of t and t ′ and
ET  g2 = t ′ and ES  g1 = t.
(iii) There exists a modelMS such thatMS  T hAhS if and only if there exists a modelMT such thatMT  T hAhT .
The analogical relation R induces a relation R ⊆ MS × MT that respects functions f ∈ FuncT hS and
g ∈ FuncT hT . In other words, for all terms tS ∈ T erm(S, VS, CS) and tT ∈ T erm(T , VT , CT ): if 〈tS, tT 〉 ∈ R
then 〈I+S (tS), I+T (tT )〉 ∈ R. This means that for a given R, the reference determined by modelsMS andMT coincide
not only on the formula level but also on the term level.
Another way to represent the idea behind the concept of an analogical relation can be given by Fig. 5. The relations
R and R represent the analogical relation between the source and target theories and the induced relation between
the models, respectively. The relation R between theories T hAhS ⊕ T ermS and T hAhT ⊕ T ermT is induced by the
algorithm associating terms and formulas of the two theories. 15 The interpretation functions I+S and I
+
T shift the
syntactic association to the semantic level, namely to a relation R between two models. The consistency assumptions
for the underlying models ensure that there is an analogical relation between the two domains. Notice that model
theoretically, there are many models for T hAhT and T h
Ah
S provided the underlying axioms are consistent. An analogical
relation models these ideas: based on the association of facts and laws of the two domains, it is required that every
model making facts and laws in the source true there is a model of the target domain making the corresponding
theory true.
We can now examine the complete diagram for heuristic-driven theory projection (Fig. 6) step-by-step.
The core of the diagram: The core is similar to the diagram in Fig. 5, specifying relations R′ and R simulating the
syntactic correspondence between the conceptualization of source and target (after the algorithm generated associated
pairs of facts and laws) and the semantic association between interpretations on the models. Additionally we added
AG—the axioms of the generalized theory of the source and target—together with substitutions1 and2 allowing to





, respectively, and terms that can be generated by the underlying equational
theories.
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Fig. 6. Diagrammatic representation of theory projection.
regain the source and target from the generalized theory. The left and right lower parts of Fig. 6 represent the (possible)
changes of the source and target domains induced by the heuristic association of the algorithm.
Here are some remarks concerning the target side: the input, given by AT , is a meager conceptualization of the target
domain. By possible transfers of facts and laws from the source to the target and possible equivalence transformations
of expressions relative to the equational theory ET (triggered by the algorithm), AAhT ⊕ T ermT is generated using an
injection function (modulo equivalences relative to ET ). The input AT as well as the modiﬁed input AAhT ⊕ T ermT
corresponds to theories T hT and T hAh ⊕ T ermT . The input AT with its corresponding theory T hT can be injectively
mapped intoAAhT ⊕T ermT and T hAh ⊕T ermT . Notice that in the source domain the arrows have the inverse direction,
because a rich theory about a domain will be restricted to those facts and laws that can be consistently matched with
or consistently transferred to the target.
The analogical relation: In Deﬁnition 11, an analogical relation between source and target was deﬁned as the
following set:
R ⊆ (T hAhS × T hAhT ) ⊕ (T erm(S, VS, CS) × T erm(T , VT , CT )).
This relation is slightly modiﬁed in Fig. 6: R is restricted to the facts, laws, and terms that are induced by the input.
The resulting relation R′ is speciﬁed as follows:
R′ ⊆ (AAhS × AAhT ) ⊕ (T ermS × T ermT ).
Functions gAhS and g
Ah
T guarantee that these facts, laws, and terms can be generalized to theories T h
Ah
S ⊕ T ermS and
T h
Ah
T ⊕ T ermT , respectively.
Experiments/Tests: The test procedure of the algorithm is represented by a theory T hexp specifying the experiments
in the target domain. Notice that these experiments are restricted by the condition that every functional expression
must correspond to an observable. Mapping the occurring theories to a model theoretic level using an interpretation
function I+ (relative to S, AAhS ⊕ T ermS , etc.) we can simulate the relational constraints on the syntactic level on the
model theoretic level as well. Experiments ensure that the analogical relation is based and tested on laws of nature in
the case of qualitative physics. A more general context would require other tests which can be based, for example, on
interactions with other agents, on abstract calculations and the like.
The generalized theory and the generalized model: In Fig. 6, I+G AG ⊕ T ermG : AG ⊕ T ermG −→ MG
is induced by the algorithm HDTP-A and the interpretations I+S and I
+
T . The corresponding homomorphic extension
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I+G : T hAhG ⊕ T ermG −→ MG is not represented in Fig. 6 due to readability reasons. Furthermore, there are
projection mappings PrS :MS →MG and PrT :MT →MG.
5. The modeling of metaphors
Based on the machinery developed in Section 3, we can apply HDTP to metaphoric expressions. The structure of
this section is as follows: ﬁrst, we will examine certain types of metaphors. Second, we will roughly discuss differences
between the Rutherford analogy and the corresponding metaphorical expression. Third, we will model more general
metaphoric expressions.
5.1. Types of metaphors
There are many different classiﬁcations of metaphors. Additionally there are many closely related concepts to
metaphors in linguistic theories like idioms, forms of irony, similes, etc. In the following, we will discuss roughly three
types of metaphors. The ﬁrst type of metaphors connects noun phrases with a form of to be. Examples of this type of
metaphors are the following ones:
(4)(i) Electrons are the planets of the atom.
(ii) Electricity is the water of an electric circuit.
(iii) Lawyers are sharks.
(iv) Juliet is the sun.
Another type ofmetaphors assigns a particular attribute to a concept (noun phrase) that typicallywould not be considered
as applicable in a conventional interpretation. Reasons for the non-applicability of the attribute are often sort problems:
A liquid can have a color, it can be oily or transparent, it can ﬂow, be cold, or be warm and the like, but usually it cannot
be soft like in (5)(i).
(5)(i) A soft wine.
(ii) A cold warrior.
(iii) A warm acknowledgment.
Whereas examples like the ones in (4) and (5) are as simple as possible, this is not in general true for metaphors
occurring in poetic contexts. Examples like the often cited poem Fog by Carl Sandburg where fog is metaphorically
correlated to cats are more complicated (quoted according to [18]):
The fog comes
on little cat feet.
It sits looking
over harbor and city
on silent haunches
and then moves on.
Another type of expressions which is related to metaphors are idioms. They are usually considered as lexicalized
metaphors, i.e. as metaphors that are already transformed into conventionally interpreted expressions. We will not
consider language change phenomena like idioms in this paper. Furthermore, examples of irony and similes will not
be considered in this section. Last but not least, we do not analyze certain types of unconventional usage of concepts
in natural languages as metaphorical. For example, if Tom says to Jim that his ﬁsh is in the living room, referring to
the wooden ﬁsh he bought in Singapore, then this non-conventional usage of the concept ﬁsh is not investigated here.
5.2. The Rutherford analogy as a metaphor
Our modeling in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 presupposes a logical reformulation of physical theories—clearly with the
restriction that the representation is qualitative not quantitative. These theories were used to generalize laws and facts
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Table 3




planet: object electron: object
sun: object atom: object
solar_system: object
facts facts
revolves_around(planet, sun) P (electron, atom)
central_body(solar_system, sun)
R(x, y) ↔ revolves_around(x, z) ∧ central_body(z, y)
from the source and the target domains. A physicist clearly has a theory-guided conceptualization when she is trying
to understand a metaphor. This theory needs to be taken into account when modeling the process of understanding.
Whereas this is a natural setting for modeling predictive analogies in the described situational embedding, this does not
seem to be appropriate in the case metaphorical expressions are modeled more generally. Understanding a metaphor
like (4)(i), in general, does not presuppose knowledge about facts and laws of physical theories. A rather simple and
straightforward solution is just to thin out the used representation for the predictive analogy case.
In our view, metaphors operate on a basis that corresponds to a large extent to lexical meanings of the involved
concepts. In particular, what is missing is a theory of a particular domain under consideration: the lexical meaning of a
concept most often does not involve a spelled-out conceptualization comparable to current scientiﬁc theories. Rather
one or more preferred properties are often associated with metaphors governing the new non-conventional meaning
of the involved target concepts. In order to make metaphor (4)(i) more precise, the concept planet is speciﬁed by
its relation to sun which must be available but is not explicitly mentioned. The same holds for the concepts nucleus
indirectly introduced by the concept atom.
• The concept sun is a lexicalized entity. As a possible conceptualization, sun can have the following properties: it
occurs with other objects (like planets) and builds the center of a more complex system that includes sun and these
other objects. Important is that this system is ﬁnite, i.e. that it is nothing that is arbitrarily extended.
• The lexical meaning of planet includes a particular relation to another object sun, i.e. the concept planet is partially
deﬁned via a two-ary relation revolves_around(x, y) together with a certain sort restriction with respect to x and
y. The idea is that sort restrictions allows x and y only to be of sort object (and not of sort real or time etc.). Although
sun is not mentioned in (4)(i) we can assume revolves_around(planet, sun) in the source domain when background
knowledge and an appropriate inference mechanism is available. Hence, the conceptualization of planet introduces
a concept sun and links both concepts together.
• We think that revolves_around is the preferred property assigned to planet. (In other metaphors in which planet
occurs this can be different. For example, preferred properties could be heavy, round, etc.)
The linguistic structure of metaphors allows to partially construct the analogical relation R speciﬁed in Deﬁnition 11.
Knowing that planets occur in a solar system we add the idea of a central body system to the source. What we get by a
second-order reasoning step is a relation deﬁned by the central body system constituted by solar system and sun and a
revolves_around relation between planet and solar system (compare Table 3).
Using this modeling of the domains, it is possible to apply theory projection. HDTP yields the desired generalization
establishing the fact revolving_around(electron, nucleus) in the target domain. To established the generalization
we used the syntactical structure of the metaphor and relatively weak assumptions about the lexical meaning of the
involved concepts.
5.3. The general case
First, we will examine examples of metaphoric expressions like the ones in (5). This type of metaphors establishes
an analogical relation between an adjective and a noun. Again the syntactic structure of such metaphors provide a hint
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lit t le(f eet) moves(f og)






P (cat, f eet)
to which domain the involved concepts belong to: the noun is used as input for the target domain and the adjective is
used as input for the source domain. A characteristic feature of expressions like the ones in (5) to be interpreted as
a metaphor, is that the adjective cannot occur in the target domain with its lexical meaning. But the adjective is not
sufﬁcient to determine totally the source domain. It is essential that the source domain can be enriched by background
knowledge in order to become compatible with the target domain: For example, in (5)(ii) it is crucial that cold is
enriched with concepts like deadhearted or insentient. Clearly not only background knowledge but also an inference
mechanism (corresponding to a theory) is necessary to draw this conclusion. Furthermore a sortal restriction applies:
the inferred adjectives in the source domain need to be applicable to humans, because else an analogical relation cannot
be established. Similarly as in the modeling of the Rutherford metaphor in Section 5.2 the linguistic structure of the
metaphors in (5) determine partially the analogical relation R from Deﬁnition 11, because the adjective on the source
side can only be applied to certain nouns coming from the source domain. Given this situation an application of HDTP
results in the desired interpretations of the metaphors given in (5).
We will now consider the poem Fog by Sandburg mentioned in Section 5.1. The ﬁrst problem is whether the involved
concepts occurring in the poem should be assigned to the source domain or the target domain. A promising strategy
yielding an appropriate conceptualization as input for the algorithm HDTP-A is to assign fog and moves to the target
input AT , and the rest (plus some background knowledge) to the source input AS . In other words, concepts used as
input for the target domain are either the target concept (fog) or attributes that are compatible with fog relative to their
lexical meaning. Again the linguistic analysis of the poem gives a hint how to establish the analogical relation R. Last
but not least—similar to the case of the Rutherford analogy—we add a predicate P ′(fog) that will be crucially used in
the further procedure. Table 4 summarizes a (slightly simpliﬁed) conceptualization of the poem.
The function over : object → space is a rough approximation of a modeling of prepositions modifying local
attributes. The unspeciﬁed relation P(cat, f eet) is triggered by the connection between cat and feet in the ﬁrst verse of
the poem. Applying HDTP (without further background knowledge) results in the association of a/f og together with
properties like moves(a)/moves(f og). Although this is in no sense wrong, the usual interpretation of the poem is the
association of cat and fog. In order to establish this analogical relation, we need background knowledge specifying
paradigmatic properties and behaviors of cats and additionally an inference mechanism that allows us to deduce that
a behaves cat-like: it creeps. Then the resulting complex predicate could be generalized and transferred to the target
domain resulting in a speciﬁcation of P ′.
116 H. Gust et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 354 (2006) 98–117
6. Conclusions
The examples discussed make crucial assumptions about the involved domains. For the general case of metaphors,
it is clear that such assumptions play an important role for the understanding of metaphors: often the lexical meaning
of the involved concepts are not sufﬁcient to establish an analogical relation, but more is needed like background
knowledge or inference mechanisms deducing new concepts from the input.
Clearly most of the knowledge that is required to understand metaphors is covered by the designated properties of
concepts in the source domain. In general, several of these properties needs to be assumed. For example, planet could
have a similar role sun has in the Rutherford analogy when we change the roles like in (6):
(6) An electron in a hydrogen atom is the moon of this atom.
In this example, planet needs to be introduced and linked to moon. The relevant properties of planet change dramat-
ically: now the gravitation center is considered to be the planet. What is needed for an appropriate modeling is a list
of designated properties of the involved concepts. Such a list must contain relevant information concerning possible
properties of concepts that can play a role in metaphors. Furthermore, it seems to be reasonable to rank these properties
according to their importance. Clearly, this is a purely empirical problem, but it is necessary to get the correct input for
the machinery.
In this paper, we showed on the one hand that metaphors and analogies are closely related to each other but exhibit
signiﬁcant differences at the other. We introduced the framework HDTP as a means to model generalizations of theories
together with the correlated substitutions instantiating the generalized theory with respect to the original domains.
HDTP was characterized syntactically, algorithmically, and semantically. We applied HDTP to predictive analogies
in qualitative physics, to corresponding metaphors of such predictive analogies, to analogies where the adjective
modiﬁes a noun metaphorically, and ﬁnally to a (more or less) complex poem. HDTP-A is implemented in PROLOG
(cf. [12]). The algorithm HDTP-A solves convincingly the standard problems of analogical reasoning well known from
the literature.
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